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Cable, Copyright, Communications: Controversy
N Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System' THE SU-
PREME COURT HELD that cable television 2 systems do not violate
federal copyright law when they receive and retransmit TV signals
from distant3 markets. Plaintiffs, Columbia Broadcasting System,
has contended that a 'distance' test, such as that adhered to by the
lower court,4 should be applied to the Teleprompter situation, and that
the ability of the subscriber to receive distant signals distinguished
this case from the 1968 Court decision of Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc.5 The Court, however, determined that regard-
less of the distance of the signal imported, cable systems executed a
viewer's function.
1415 U.S. 394 (1974).
2 Hereinafter referred to as "cable." Cable television is known by many other names-
CATV, an acronym for Community Antenna Television is often used, but many cable au-
thorities contend this is a misnomer because it is no longer a "cottage industry" which
serves only rural communities as the name implies. See, United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly, 255 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). It is also known as broadband distribution networks, coaxial
communications, wired television, and by various other names. A CATV system as defined
by the FCC is as follows:
Any facility that, in whole or in part, received directly, or indirectly over
the air, and amplifies or otherwise modifies the signals transmitting programs
broadcast by one or more television or radio stations and distributes such signals
by wire or cable to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service,
but such term shall not include 1) any such facility that serves fewer than 50
subscribers, or 2) any such facility that serves only the residents of one or more
dwellings under common ownership, control, or management and commercial
establishments located on the premises of such an apartment house. 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.5 (a) (1972).
3 These "distant signals" have been defined in at least three ways: "a signal rebroadcast
without relay which cannot be clearly received; a signal whose pickup does not add appre-
ciably to the size of the broadcast advertising market; and a signal received beyond the
Grade B contour. The Grade B contour of a television station is the boundary of a hypo-
thetical area at whose outer limits television reception of 'a quality acceptable to the median
observer' is expected to be available at least 90 percent of the time at the best 50 percent
of the receiver locations, based on expected field intensities and certain assumptions as to
the nature and height of the receiving antenna and the capabilities of the television set. 47
C.F.R. § 73.684 (c) (1973). Since television transmission travels only on line of sight,
topographical conditions will affect the Grade B Contour." Note, Cable Television and
Copyright Royalties, 83 Yale L. J. 554 n. 3 (1974).
The Court of Appeals in Teleprompter found instead that "it is easier to state what
is not a distant signal than to state what is a distant signal. Accordingly, we have con-
cluded that any signal capable of projecting, without relay or retransmittal an acceptable
image that a CATV system receives off-the-air during a substantial portion of the time by
means of an antenna erected in or adjacent to the CATV community is not a distant
signal." Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 351 (2d
Cit. 1973) modified, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
4Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973),
modified, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
s392 U.S. 390 (1968), rev'g 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), and 255 F. Supp. 177(S.D.
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The responsibility for deciding copyright problems in broadcast
television and in community antenna television lies with Congress, 6
but in the absence of legislative action the courts have had to deal
with the problem as best they could. This Note will examine the efforts
of the courts, the legislature, and the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) to apply the Copyright Act of 1909 to the technological
developments of the twentieth century. It is submitted that the sig-
nificance of Teleprompter lies not in the Court's determination that
there was no copyright infringement - for that finding will soon be
negated by upcoming copyright law revision - but in the inability
of the Court to discard past inflexible and unrealistic approaches to
the 1909 Copyright Act. Offered is a different method of viewing
cable communications in terms of the Copyright Act, which recog-
nizes that black and white categorizations are inappropriate and
hopefully accommodates the perplexing characteristics of the cable
industry.
Cable Television: An Overview
What is it?
Cable television began in this country as a technical conduit
bringing a clearer television picture over hills and mountains and
other natural or man-made barriers. The first systems7 in the late
1940's were prompted by demand for increased and improved tele-
vision service in small, rural communities. From its nascent stages
cable has served two functions: (1) supplementing broadcasting by
improving reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such
reception would not otherwise be possible; and (2) transmitting the
signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae.9
Although still involved with television retransmission, cable has
the "technical potential to become a communications medium of abun-
dant capacity, with an almost limitless number of channels capable
of carrying virtually any kind of communications." 9 As noted in Tele-
6 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974).
7 While there is some dispute in the industry concerning who built the first cable system in
the United States, L. E. (Ed) Parsons has the best documented claim to having done so,
at Astoria, Oregon, in 1949. Smith, The Emergence of CATV: A Look at the Evolution of
a Revolution, 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE 967, 968 (1970). However, many industry
spokesmen maintain that Robert J. Tarlton of Lansford, Pa. built the first system known
as the Panther Valley Television Company. See R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 3 (1972).
Still others, among them the National Association of Broadcasters, claim the originator to
have been John Walson. See 86 BROADCASTING, May 27, 1974 at 95. For a further dis-
cussion of the history of CATV see M. ALICE & M. PHILLIPS, CATV, A HISTORY OF
COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION (1972).
8United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968). This separation of
functions has no significance for copyright purposes; rather it is related only to the issue
of the regulatory authority of the FCC over the cable industry. Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. 415 U.S. 394, 406 (1974).
9 CABINET COMMITTEE ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
4 (1974). This report, issued on January 14, 1974, was the product of a special commit-
(Continued on next page)
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prompter, cable no longer is characterized by the passivity of merely
retransmitting signals; program origination,10 sale of commercials,
interconnection, 1 and two-way communications are all developments
(Continued from preceding page)
tee formed by the President in June, 1971. Working under the aegis of the President's
Office of Telecommunications Policy, the Committee called for: (1) the development of
cable systems as "common carriers" by separating the hardware from the programming
function- local franchise holders would be distributors separated from control of pro-
gramming; and (2) a gradual federal de-regulation of cable operations over the next
decade, with emphasis on the roles of private industry and local governments.
The court in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 404
n. 8 (1974), explained:
Program origination initially consisted of simple arrangements on spare channels
using automated cameras providing time, weather, news ticker or stock ticker
information, and aural systems with music or news announcements. The function
has been explained to include coverage of sports and other live events, news
services, moving picture films, and specially created dramatic and non-dramatic
programs.
This program origination is also termed by the FCC as "cablecasting" of which there
are two types: 1) origination and 2) access. Origination cablecasting is controlled by the
cable operator while access cablecasting is presented on public access channels and is con-
trolled by the person(s) who produce the program. FCC rules require that a system with
more than 3,500 subscribers have non-automated program origination. The following table
indicated the extent of program origination in the U.S. as of June, 1973:
Systems with automatic originations .............................. 1,664
Systems with automatic originations only .......................... 996
Tim e & weather .................................... 1,597
N ew s ticker ........................................ 288
Stock ticker ........................................ 124
Sports ticker ....................................... 42
M essage wheel ..................................... 189
M usic ............................................ 62
Em ergency alert .................................... 20
A dvertising ....................................... 322
O ther ............................................ 58
Systems with non-automatic originations ... ....................... 768
Local live .......................................... 587
CATV network ..................................... 40
Film ............................................. 18 1
Tape ............................................. 288
A dvertising ........................................ 233
O ther ............................................ 130
Systems with no originations ................................... 1,114
TOTAL SYSTEMS ORIGINATING .............................. 1,764
Planned
Systems planning automatic originations ................. 148
Systems planning local originations ..................... 177
TOTAL SYSTEMS PLANNING ................................. 154
43 TELEVISION FACTBOOK SERVICES VOLUME 84-a (1973) [hereinafter referred to as
TELEVISION FACTBOOK].
n Interconnection occurs by linking the headends of different cable systems, usually with
microwave, as a means of distributing programming regionally or nationally. However,
until the penetration of cable increases, the total interconnection would probably not be
large enough to be economically viable. The more promising form of interconnection is
with satellites.
[T]elevision signals would be radiated into space from any one of dozens of
earth stations, then radiated back to earth stations capable of covering the entire
continental United States and of distributing the signals at low cost to individual
cable system head-ends.
SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION
OF ABUNDANCE 41 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as THE SLOAN COMMISSION]. 3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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of the cable system that make it more than a mere extension of broad-
cast television.
Unlike broadcast television which transmits signals over-the-air
and is limited by the scarcity of channel space within the electromag-
netic spectrum, cable, by means of a network of coaxial cable,12 allows
the utilization of adjacent channels without the usually resultant
signal interference. The cable network connects the headend,13 or
electronic control system with receiving antennas, and the terminal,1 4
normally the home television set. The cable, either underground or
attached to telephone utility poles, is connected with feeder lines from
which drop lines fan out and connect with the home terminal. In order
to maintain the strength of the signal throughout the trunk line,
amplifiers are placed about every two thousand feet.
While in 1952 there were 70 cable systems in the nation serving
14,000 subscribers, by 1970 there were 2,350 systems with 4,500,000
subscribers. 15 Cable's explosive 6 growth saw an increase in channel
capacity to 20 channels,17 importation of distant signals via micro-
wave links, and the emergence of multiple system operators (MSO's)
who bought out small cable operators and merged cable systems. In
12 Coaxial cable consists of copper wire surrounded by an insulating layer of plastic foam
which in turn is covered by a thin sheath of knitted aluminum. The cable is encased in an
outer protective skin. The wire and the shielding interact creating an electromagnetic field
between them. Bell Laboratories developed the first coaxial cable, which was then used
during World War II for military communications. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION
CENTER, CABLE DATA 6 (1972).
13 The headend is usually located at the antenna site of a cable system and consists of equip-
ment which amplifies, filters, and converts broadcast television signals and sends them down
the cable. See R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION, 4 (1972).
14 In addition to the connectors that connect the TV set with the cable, a terminal may also
have converters where more than twelve channels are relayed on a single cable. The con-
verter extends the capacity of the home set beyond the 12 standard VHF channels, and
prevents against the interference of strong local over-the-air signals. In the future a ter-
minal may also include videotape recorders, keyboards and computers.
1 Smith, The Emergence of CATV, supra note 7, at 970, citing TELEVISION FACTBOOK,
supra note 10. The year 1952 was the first one in which reliable statistics on cable TV
were assembled.
16The cable industry's growth has been characterized as "*explosive, by the FCC. Second
Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 738 (1966).
17 In 1953, the cable industry introduced 12 channel capacity. The average channel capacity
for all systems in 1972 was 10.34. The FCC requires all new systems in the 100 largest
television markets to carry a minimum of 20 channels. The following chart indicates the
channel capacity of cablesystems as of June, 1973:
O ver 20 ............................................ 207
13-20 .............................................. 262
6-12 .................. ............................ 2,181
5 only ............................................. 287
Sub-5 ... ................. .......... ... ...... .... .. . 4 9
N ot available ............... ..... .................... 46
T otal .............................................. 3,032
Two-Way
Systems operating .................................... 63
Systems planning ..................................... 153
TELEVISION FACTBOOK, supra note 10.
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1973 almost eight million households were served by approximately
3,000 systems, and the industry is now growing at a rate of more
than ten per cent per year.18 The systems range in size from under
fifty to over 50,000 subscribers, the average size being about 2,150
subscribers.1"
'a CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 4. The following table indicates the
growth of the cable industry from 1952-73:
Operating Total
Year Systems Subscribers
1952 70 14,000
1953 150 30,000
1954 300 65,000
1955 400 150,000
1956 450 300,000
1957 500 350,000
1958 525 450,000
1959 560 550,000
1960 640 650,000
1961 700 725,000
1962 800 850,000
1963 1,000 950,000
1964 1,200 1,085,000
1965 1,325 1,275,000
1966 1,570 1,575,000
1967 1,770 2,100,000
1968 2,000 2,800,000
1969 2,260 3,600,000
1970 2,490 4,500,000
1971 2,639 5,300,000
1972 2,841 6,000,000
1973 2,991 7,300,000
TELEVISION FACTBOOK, supra note 10.
19 CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE DATA 5 (1972). The following chart
shows U.S. cable systems by subscriber size as of June, 1973:
Size by Subscribers Systems
20,000 & over ........................................ 31
10,000-19,999 ....................................... 119
5,000-9,999 ......................................... 252
3,500-4,999 ......................................... 176
2,000-3,499 ......................................... 417
1,000-1,999 ................. ....................... 545
500-999 ............................................ 587
50-4 99 ............................................. 8 10
49 & under .......................................... 42
N ot A vailable ....................................... 53
T otal .............................................. 3,032
TELEVISION FACTBOOK, supra note 10.
The ten largest systems as of June, 1973 are:
System Subscriber
San Diego, Cal. (Mission Table TV Inc.) ................ 75,000
New York, N. Y. (Sterling Manhattan Cable TV) .......... 57,500
New York, N. Y. (TelePrompTer) ...................... 52,174
Allentown, Pa . ...................... ............... 52,000
Northampton, Pa. (Twin County Trans-Video Inc.) ........ 50,000
Suffolk County, N . Y .................................. 40,000
Wilmington, Del ..................................... 36,127
San Rafael, Cal . ..................................... 34,000
Los Angeles, Cal. (Theta Cable of Cal.) .................. 33,673
Santa Barbara, Cal .................................... 33,186
Id. at 83-a.
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Future Potential
The principal factor prompting the evolution of cable has been
the lack of program diversity of broadcast television.20 The element
of choice is spread over a national audience and most programs are
therefore geared to the lowest common denominator of viewer's inter-
est.2 1 Cable television with its virtually unlimited channel capacity22
promises to end this economy of scarcity23 and offer more diversified
programming. Cable's greater number of channels will allow adver-
tisers to target their products to specific audiences with the correla-
tive lower cost to the advertiser who avoids paying for exposure to
audiences he has no interest in reaching. Because general-appeal
entertainment programs are likely to continue to be watched on broad-
cast television, 24 cable will be able to devote its time to programs of
special interest; it will not only expand consumer choice but also pro-
vide additional sources of revenue for the performing arts, public
and private education, and for the television program production
industry.25
As the awareness of its expansive potential as a communications
network or "information utility"26 expands, cable is likened less to
broadcast television and more to the press media. Two-way communi-
cations may end the need for geographical proximity in communica-
20 Smith, The Emergence of CATV, supra note 7, at 971.
21 CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 12.
2 With existing technology a single coaxial cable can carry 28-35 channels, plus the entire
AM and FM radio bands. Nathaniel Feldman, a Rand Corporation engineer, predicts that
in 10-20 years a four-cable system will have a capacity of 400 channels of television. R.
SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 7 (1972).
23 In many instances, the viewer in prime time may choose from among only three
network programs, one educational television program, and perhaps one more
program, which may well be a network rerun, offered by a local station not
affiliated with a network.
CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 12. Television is limited by the gen-
eral scarcity of space within the electromagnetic spectrum and is constrained further by the
lack of space for VHF (Very High Frequency), which is the band best suited for television.
The VHF band runs from about 50MH2 (million cycles per second) to about 200 MH 2
and within the space FM radio uses the frequencies between 88 MH2 and 108 MH 2, and
aircraft navigation occupies the 108-120 MH 2 band. VHF is left with space for only twelve
television channels between 54-88 MH 2 and between 174-216 MH2. Above the VHF band
is the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band with space for seventy channels, but the higher
in the electromagnetic spectrum, the less range of the signals, making UHF less desirable for
television. THE SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 11 at 16-22.
24 This contention has been disputed by broadcast television interests who maintain that pay
cable, so labelled because each subscriber must pay for what the cable transmits, should not
be allowed to "siphon" from "free" television. A pamphlet issued by CBS entitled DOES
THE AMERICAN FAMILY NEED ANOTHER MOUTH TO FEED? maintains that in rural com-
munities where it is uneconomic for cable systems to be built, families would be denied
many of television's popular attractions if they were siphoned off to pay cable television.
25 CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 13.
26 Parker and Dunn, Information Technology: Its Social Potential, 176 SCIENCE 1392
(1972).
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tions, business, and education; merchants will advertise goods via
cable and shopping will be done without leaving home. 27 The uses of
cable communications become endless.2 8
Cable is still a relatively small industry, although the Sloan
Commission predicts that cable will reach a market penetration of
between 40-60% by 1980 (even higher in metropolitan areas) if it
continues to grow at the same rate that it has in the 1960's.29 More
pessimistic observers predict only 15% penetration by 1975.30
Regulation of Cable
The rate of growth of cable has been and will continue to be
largely responsive to the extent of local, state, and federal regulation.
Local governments, filling the void of indifference left by state and
federal authorities, became the first regulators of the industry and
gave permission to use public property and rights of way. For these
benefits cities have demanded a share of the system's profits, often
amounting to three or four per cent of the total gross subscriber re-
ceipts.31 Despite the requirement of a fee, however, franchises were
often granted without any consideration as to the system's timetable
for construction or operating requirements such as channel capacity.
Also, in some cities operators bypassed poor neighborhoods and wired
only the more affluent sections. To help curb these undesirable results,
franchise awards are now granted with greater care and more de-
liberation, with the process often taking a year or longer. Despite
increased federal regulation over the years, local franchising authori-
7 Barrow, OTP and FCC: Role of the Presidency and the Independent Agency in Communi-
cations, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 291, 299 (1974).
28 Barry Head, in Voices on the Cable, HARPERS March, 1973, at 28-9, lists various uses to
which cable communication can be put:
1. Provide new access to decision-makers.
2. Give us a survival kit for the disadvantaged by bringing them essential in-
formation on employment, housing, health, nutrition, day care, etc.
3. Significantly raise the level of public education.
4. Provide means to monitor and combat environmental deterioration.
5. Permit the population of our overcrowded cities to disperse, and enable those
who remain to form cohesive communities with easy access to each other.
6. Enable minority interest groups to reach their members, each other and the
rest of us.
7. Bring new methods to bear on crime prevention and control.
8. Carry family-planning information beyond the reach of field workers to those
who most need it.
9. Make many business trips unnecessary by making two-way video communica-
tion, data transmission, and facsimile printouts possible.
29 THE SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 173.
30 Donnelly, The Dimmer View, BARRON'S July 10, 1972, at 5.
31 The fee, or license tax, is based on the municipality's right to tax cable systems for the
privilege of using the streets. The charge must bear a reasonable relationship to the service
to the cable system. See Chicago Heights v. Public Serv. Co., 408 Ill. 604, 97 N.E.2d 807
(1951); Lombard v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 405 Ill. 209, 90 N.E.2d 105 (1950); Panther
Valley Tel. Co. v. Summit Hall, 376 Pa. 375, 102 A.2d 699 (1954).
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ties still determine initially who will build a cable system; regulate
subscriber rates and the operation of municipal channels; and monitor
the system's performance and compliance.3 2 In addition state regula-
tion, long dormant, is developing with a view towards treating cable
as a public utility33 and may eventually reach the proportions of local
and federal control.
Federal regulation of cable has evolved from an initial phase of
"indifference to one of hostility to one of mild encouragement. ' 34 The
federal regulation of cable is presently based on the Communications
Act of 193435 but despite its grant of broad regulatory powers over
radio and television36 the FCC was initially reluctant to exercise jur-
isdiction over the activities of cable TV. But pressure for federal
regulation was exerted by the broadcasting industry, which had
initially favored cable but now feared that cable was fragmenting its
audience size and advertising revenues.37 Nonetheless, as late as 1959,
the FCC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over cable TV. 38
The Commission, perhaps disconcerted over its failure to find a
jurisdictional basis in the 1959 Report and Order and the subsequent
proliferation of unregulated CATV systems, modified its position
taken regarding cable's use of microwave common carrier systems.
In the 1959 Report, the Commission had refused to impose regulations
over microwave common carriers, with the suggested alternative
method being a denial of a license for expansion when the purpose
was to supply CATV systems which adversely affected the public
interest by its impact on local stations. The Commission had ruled
3 CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9, at 23.
33 The United States Supreme Court, in Pix TV, Inc. v. Taylor, 396 U.S. 556 (1970) (per
curiam), upheld the principle of state regulation of CATV, when it affirmed the constitu-
tionality of NEV. REV. STAT. Ch. 711 (1973). M. SEIDEN, CABLE TELEVISION U.S.A. 79
(1972).
3 The Sloan Commission, supra note 11, at 152.
3547 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
361 Id. at §§ 303, 307, 309.
37 In 1958 the Senate Commerce Committee held the first hearings on the proposed regula-
tion of cable. The complainants, the television broadcasters, and the National Community
Television Association presented their views, but Congress took no action. It was also con-
tended publicly for the first time that cable systems were involved in unfair competition
with local broadcast stations because cable operators did not pay copyright royalties. Smith,
supra note 7, at 972. This issue was litigated in Cable Vision, Inc. v. UTV, 335 F.2d 348
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1964), rejecting the right of a broadcaster to
restrict CATV carriage on the basis of exclusive contract. This decision prompted the begin-
nings of the Fortnightly case in 1960.
31 In 1959 the Federal Communications Commission initiated a study, CATV and TV Re-
peater Services, designed to examine the services affecting the television broadcasting indus-
try. Central to this study was a close scrutiny of CATV and what, if any. grounds for
regulatory power existed. Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959). Under Title 2 of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 et. seq. (1962), the Commission was au-
thorized to regulate communications common carriers by supervising industry rates and
(Continued on next page)
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that imposition of the regulations would result in determining the
validity of different microwave uses, a function they considered out-
side their power. Three months later, however, a "procedural" rule
was instituted permitting the Commission to regulate microwave
carriers primarily serving CATV systems. The rule required that a
microwave system applying for renewal of a station license demon-
strate that during the previous licensing period at least 50 per cent
of total service hours and 50 per cent of the radio channels had been
used by subscribers "not directly controlling or controlled by, or under
direct or indirect common control with, the applicant. '39 Thus micro-
wave carriers, which were often either the parent or subsidiary com-
panies of CATV systems, were placed in a position of either seeking
out public receivers of their services or switching to frequencies re-
served for public service.
Carter Mountain Transmission Corp.40 marked the complete re-
versal of the FCC's position on regulating CATV through microwave
carrier systems. Carter Mountain, which supplied services to several
CATV systems in Wyoming, applied for a license to expand its facili-
ties and thus provide better service. Denying the license, the Commis-
sion concluded that the local station KWRB-TV, already in financial
difficulty as a result of CATV competition, would be forced out of
business if the CATV systems were improved. As a result, the public
interest would be affected detrimentally if the local station were
allowed to close. Carter Mountain, however, was given leave to re-
apply when it could show that the CATV system involved would not
duplicate the local station's programming when so requested and
would carry the local station on the CATV cable. With this ruling,
the FCC thus protected VHF and UHF broadcasters from economic
competition.
(Continued from preceding page)
practices. Title 3 of the Act gave the Commission the broad power to regulate uses of the
radio spectrum in order to insure the value of the services provided by the public. Three
bases suggested for asserting jurisdiction tinder the Communications Act, Sections 325 (A)
and 312(B) were rejected by the Commission. In consideration of the issue of whether
CATV was to be regulated as a common carrier, the Commission found that CATV did
not fall within the legislative intent of the Act in its definition of common carrier. Id. at
429. Next the Commission ruled that CATV did not reside within the Act's definitions of
"broadcasting," "broadcast station," or "instrumentality engaged in broadcasting," as CATV
transmits by wire rather than by air. Id. Finally, the Commission declined to find that
regulation of CATV came within the scope of its plenary power over the broadcasting in-
dustry, claiming it lacked power "to regulate any and all enterprises which to be connected
with one of the many aspects of communications." Id. Implicit in this position was the
rejection of the claim that CATV had an adverse effect on the broadcasting market. While
recognizing that undoubtedly there was an effect, "in what situations this impact becomes
serious enough to threaten a station's continued existence or serious degradation of the
quality of its service . . . we cannot tell from the data before us." Id. at 423.
3' In the Matter of Amendment of Pirt 21 of the Commission's Rules to Add a New Section
21.709 - Domestic Public Radio Services (Other than Maritime Mobile), Order FCC
59-762, July 24, 1959, 47 C.F.R. § 21.709 (Supp. 1963).
40 Carter Mountain Transm'n Corp. v. Federal Commun. Comm'n 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). See generally Note, Community Antenna Television:
Survey of a Regulatory Problem, 52 GEO. L. J. 136 (1972).
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In 1965 the FCC issued the First Report and Order 41 by which
the Commission asserted jurisdiction over microwave-linked cable
systems. 42 The report set forth carriage and non-duplication rules
emphasizing CATV's role as a supplement, not a replacement to broad-
casting,4 3 thus delving further into the fields of economic protection-
ism and "unfair competition."" The FCC's Second Report and Order45
was issued in March, 1966, less than eleven months after the issuance
of the first cable rules, and broadened FCC jurisdiction to include all
cable systems whether or not microwave-served. The FCC was also
aware of the competitive edge cable had in not having to pay, as
broadcasters did, for the programs they televised. The Commission
dulled this edge by prohibiting cable systems in the top 100 markets
from importing distant signals, and thus retarding cable's expansion
into urban areas."
4, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965).
42 The Court of Appeals in Teleprompter described the differences between point-to-point
microwave transmission and broadcasting:
A microwave link involves the transmission of signals through the air. How-
ever, microwave, transmission in itself is not broadcasting. A broadcast signal,
according to 47 U.S.C. 153(o), is transmitted by a broadcaster for "[reception]
by the public." In the case of microwave, the signal is focused and transmitted
in a narrow beam aimed with precision at the receiving points. Thus microwave
transmission is point-to-point communication. The receiving antenna must be in
the path of the signal beam. If the transmission must cover a considerable dis-
tance, the microwave signal is transmitted to the first receiving point from which
it is transmitted to another receiving point, and this process is repeated until the
signal reaches the point from which it is distributed by cable to subscribers. 476
F.2d 338, 343 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1973).
43 The Commission held that a CATV system must, within the limits of its channel capacity,
carry the signals of stations that place signals over the community served by the system. In
addition, CATV systems were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such local sta-
tions for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast. See generally, F.C.C. Order
supra note 41, at 699-702, 716-730.
"The report asserted that a CATV's duplication of local programming by importing distant
signals is unfair competition because broadcasters and CATV systems do not compete for
programming on an equal footing. The FCC recommended "a reasonable measure of ex-
clusivity" to protect the program suppliers and the stations. M. ALICE & M. PHILLIPS,
CATV, A HISTORY OF COMMUNITY ANTENNA TELEVISION 71 (1972).
452 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
"A cable system that could convince the FCC that importation of distant signals into a major
market area would not have an adverse economic impact on local broadcasters was per-
mitted to have an evidentiary hearing, but the burden of proof was on the cable system.
Aside from protecting local independent stations and the still infant UHF stations, the
time-consuming evidentiary hearings adopted were intended to supply the Commission
with further data, knowledge and experience concerning the effects of CATV penetration
into major markets. "As we gain more knowledge in this important area," the Commis-
sion declared ". . . we shall revise or terminate the procedure, as the experience indicates."
2 F.C.C.2d 725, 786 (1966).
Cable operators feared that in major markets it would be too difficult to attract cus-
tomers without being able to import distant signals, because the cities were already well-
served by local broadcast signals. See 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
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In 1968 the Supreme Court, noting that the FCC had gradually
assumed jurisdiction over cable systems through Carter Mountain
and the First and Second Report and Order, finally upheld the Com-
mission's power to regulate cable television.47
One week later came the decision in Fortnightly Corporation v.
United Artists Television, Inc.4 Classifying the CATV system as a
passive beneficiary rather than an active performer, the Court found
the systems not liable for infringing the rights of the copyright hold-
ers under the Copyright Act of 1909.
Armed with these decisions and what information the FCC had
gathered from the evidentiary hearings conducted the previous two
and one half years, the Commission issued on December 12, 1968 a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Inquiry.49 The information de-
rived from the past hearings had served as warning to the Commis-
sion that, if left unchecked, cable systems providing distant signals
would penetrate major market areas to the extent of nearly 50 per
cent.50 This degree of penetration coupled with the unfair competitive
advantage that the Commission regarded CATV as possessing would,
it was concluded, significantly disrupt the development or healthy
maintenance of television broadcast service.
Since copyright revision bills had floundered in Congress for
nearly five years, the ostensible role of the proposed rules was to
bridge the gap in communications and copyright policy created by
the absence of Congressional action. To replace the distant signal
importation restrictions of the Second Report the requirement was
proposed that retransmission consent must be obtained from the
broadcasting station prior to retransmitting the broadcast signal.51
Further, besides obtaining consent, the cable operators would be
required to pay a royalty to the consenting station. The Commission
envisioned the proposal would serve the needs of all concerned parties:
4 Southwestern Cable Company v. United States, 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In this case, Mid-
west Television Inc., a San Diego television broadcaster, sought relief from Southwestern
Cable Co., an importer of distinct television signals from Los Angeles into the San Diego
area under the FCC's Second Report and Order rules regarding distant signal importation.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on petition for review, held that the FCC lacked the
authority, under the Communications Act of 1934, to issue the orders. 378 F.2d 118 (9th
Cit. 1967). On certiorari the Supreme Court held that the Commission's authority ex-
tended to those operations "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Com-
mission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." 392 U.S.
at 178. The Court further concluded that the specific regulations in question were within
the scope of the Commission's authority. Thus the jurisdiction that the FCC had slowly
and hesitantly assumed over cable operations was given full affirmance.
48392 U.S. 390 (1968).
49 Matter of Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. Relative to
CATV Systems, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
-'Id. at 431, 36.
51 Id. at 432, 11 38.
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cable systems would be granted the right to retransmit distant signals
into major viewing markets; local broadcasters would indirectly be
relieved of the unfair competitive edge through the royalties paid
broadcasters by CATV systems; and, adding the final ingredient,
copyright holders could demand additional remuneration from the
broadcasters because of the increased royalties.
What the Commissioners overlooked, and the flaw of the pro-
posal, was that contracts between broadcast stations and copyright
holders frequently include covenants prohibiting the broadcaster from
granting CATV the necessary retransmission consent. As a result, the
cable operator was forced to seek consent from the copyright holder
to retransmit material which Fortnightly had ruled was his for the
taking.52 By way of agency regulation, and under the guise of com-
munications policy, the FCC thus attempted to imposed restrictions
upon cable systems which the Copyright Act of 1909, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, did not permit.
Nearly three years later, and perhaps by then doubtful of the
proposed rules' efficacy, Dean Burch, Chairman of the FCC, and Dr.
Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunications
(OTP), sponsored negotiations between representatives of the indus-
tries principally involved in the controversy; i.e., the cable industry,
which felt that its expansion was unduly limited by the FCC's restric-
tions on the importation of distant signals; broadcasters, who felt
that it was unfair to permit cable systems to carry the same programs
as they did without bearing the burdens of bargaining or paying for
them; and the copyright owners, who wanted to halt the use of their
product unless royalties were received. The deadlock was broken by
all parties' consenting to the "Consensus Agreement of November,
1971." 53 This Consensus Agreement was accepted and signed by the
National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the National Associ-
ation of Broadcasters (NAB), and the Committee of Copyright Own-
ers (CCO).
The Consensus Agreement was endorsed by the FCC in their
Cable Television Report and Order, effective March 31, 1972.5 In the
same report the Commission expressly rejected the retransmission
consent theory proposed in the winter of 1968, commenting that
52 See, Lipper, The Congress, the Court, and the Commissions: A Legacy of Fortnightly,
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521 (1965).
53 Statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
and of the Association of Motion Picture and Television Producers, Inc., accompanied by
Gerald Meyer, counsel. Hearings on S. 1361 before the Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st session,
July 31 and August 1, 1973. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings).
5 CABLE TELEVISION REPORT AND ORDER, F.C.C. 72-103, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). This
report is often referred to as the Third Report and Order.
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[e] xperience has indicated that it simply will not achieve our
basic objectives .... the prospect is not promising because
of the necessity for close cooperation of all the parties-
and such cooperation, as the comments indicate, is highly
unlikely.15 5
The approach adopted in place of the retransmission consent
theory extends exclusivity rules to cover non-network as well as net-
work programming. In addition, most of the distant signal carriage
restrictions imposed by the FCC, which had effectively frozen cable
industry development, were lifted. Distant signal importation was
permitted, subject to limitations depending on the size of the market
into which the importation was to take place.56
One controversy not resolved by the Consensus Agreement cen-
tered around the fees to be paid to the copyright holders for the
retransmission of broadcasts. Despite extended discussion between
concerned parties, the participants reached no compromise, the result
being a provision in the Consensus Agreement that, should further
talks produce no acceptable rate, the matter would be decided by
arbitration.5
After further conferences between CCO and NCTA no agreement
was reached as to the rate of fee payments which would provide rea-
sonable and just compensation to copyright holders for the use of
their works and yet not exceed the point at which the burden would
significantly discourage capital investment in CATV systems. The
failure to reach an agreement prompted CATV to reject arbitration,
despite its consent in the Consensus Agreement to such a procedure,
and instead, to choose to support the rate scales contained in Section
111 of S. 1361 then under consideration by the Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.58 Soon afterward studies were published describing the feasibility
of Section ll1's rates, the proposed rates, and the arbitration process.
To date, this issue remains the stumbling block of effective cable
regulation.
Concurrent with much of the debate stemming from the 1971
Consensus Agreement was the FCC's entry into its third and present
phase of cable regulation. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp.,5 9 held that the FCC had authority to require
55 Id. at 165.
56 d. at 165, 181.
17Id. at 165. See also id. at Appendix D, Copyright Legislation § D.
-8 Hearings, supra note 53.
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cable operators to originate programming. This case marked the
beginning of a new attitude of the Commission which accepted the
use of cable to originate programming in exchange for cable's pro-
moting and developing new public interest services.
This quid pro quo approach was the basis for the Third Report
and Order issued in 1972. The report maintains that cable systems
should provide the most services where broadcast television is strong-
est, i.e. the major television markets.60 For the major market systems
the FCC rules require a capacity for the following "designated" ser-
vices: (1) Retransmission service - mandatory carriage of local
broadcast television stations and permissible carriage of distant
broadcast stations up to defined limits (usually one or two) ; (2) Local
origination service - at least one channel, under the control of the
cable operator, devoted to local, non-automated programming;
(3) Public access service - one free channel for the use of the gen-
eral public on a non-discriminatory, first-come, first-served basis;
(4) Educational access service- one channel, free for at least five
years, reserved for use by local educational authorities; (5) Govern-
ment access service - one channel, free for at least five years, re-
served for government uses; (6) Leased access service - a number
of channels available for lease to others who wish to provide new
"undesignated" services via cable. 61
The rules also require a 20 channel minimum capacity and a
two-way capability which entails having the capacity not only to send
signals to a subscriber but also to return non-voice signals from the
subscriber back to the cable control center.
The Law of Copyright
A copyright holder is given a limited monopoly on the dissemi-
nation of his own work primarily in order to secure "the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors", 62 and
secondarily in order to remunerate the author in recognition of his
inherent right to the fruits of his own labor; both encourage further
creative activity. It is in light of this underlying purpose of both the
copyright clause of the Constitution and the Copyright Act of 1909
that the liability of cable television for copyright infringement must
be considered. An understanding of the development of copyright law
in this country, with emphasis upon the legislative intent of the 1909
Act, is crucial towards determining the statute's6 capacity to deal
with the innovation of cable television.
Third Report and Order, supra, note 54.
61 CABLE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, note 9 at 23.
62 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
63By the act of July 30, 1946 (61 Stat. 642), the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, was
codified and enacted into positive law as title 17 of the U.S. Code.
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The first federal copyright statute," largely an inheritance from
England,65 was passed in 1790 and gave the federal government statu-
tory authority" to administer copyrights. The statute thereby imple-
mented 67 the copyright clause of the Constitution which reads as
follows:
The Congress shall have the power... to promote the prog-
ress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respec-
tive writings and discoveries. 68
"The first state statute originated in the Connecticut legislature of 1783 at the soliciation
of Noah Webster, who wanted copyright protection for his spelling book. Delaware was
the only state of the original thirteen not to pass a copyright statute. H.R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1909).
6The 1790 Federal copyright statute was modelled on the 1710 English Statute Anne. The
Statute of Anne was "the first law ever enacted for the protection of literary property [and]
is the parent of all copyright legislation." R. DEWOLF, OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 7
(1925). The principle of copyright, however, antedates the Statute of Anne. The Republic
of Venice granted to John Speyer in 1469 the exclusive right of printing the letters of
Cicero and of Pliny for a total of five years. "This is the earliest 'copyright' of which we
know." Id. at 2.
"The English case of Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1744), which
upheld the Statute of Anne, outlined the two types of copyrights, statutory and common
law. "Common law copyright is a claim to literary or artistic property which is automatic
and which lasts indefinitely until publication." H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 241 (1973). Upon publication, the author's exclusive rights are de-
termined by statutory authority. Under the 1909 Copyright Act the initial copyright period
is 28 years with an optional renewal period of another 28 years. The American counterpart
to Donaldson v. Beckett is Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 656 (1834),
which held that there was no common law right of copyright after publication:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may ob-
tain redress against anyone who deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining
a copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but
this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive
property in the future publication of the work, after the author shall have pub-
lished it to the world.
The 1909 Copyright Act, as codified, expressly preserves the common law right to un-
published works:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author
or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished works without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefor. 17 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1964).
According to one author, a common law copyright action might be used to impose liability,
but he warns that "[slince the very nature of the broadcasting industry is to achieve the
widest possible dissemination of telecast works, it is unlikely that an action under the com-
mon law would be successful; indeed, no case can be found which recognized common law
relief for infringed telecommunicated works." Comment, The Cable Compromise: Inte-
gration of Federal Copyright and Telecommaunications Policies, 17 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 340,
341-42 (1973).
6
1 "The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the
power to grant such rights if it thinks best." H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1909).
6U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. Some courts have held that the test for receiving copyright protec-
tion is whether or not a work promotes "progress of science and useful arts." One com-
mentator has noted, however, that it is quite conceivable that the drafters of the clause
never intended such a subjective determination as to a particular work's value, but rather
they "may have felt and provided that the system of protecting authors would promote
progress even if works of doubtful value were included." H. HOWELL, COPYRIGHT LAW
12 (A. Latman ed. 1962). The "limited times" provision has been viewed as an attempt
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Congress and the courts have rejected a literal reading of the word
"writings" in favor of a liberal construction 69 that does not restrict
copyright legislation to the printed word. Indeed, although there is
little historical70 guidance as to the intended scope of the word "writ-
ings," "a literal reading of the clause in the Constitution would invali-
date part of every copyright law passed since 1790 . .. , and radio
and television would be far beyond the bounds of the clause's reach.
As Judge Learned Hand asserted, the Constitution was not meant to
embalm "inflexibly the habits of 1789, '72 and, thus, Congress and the
courts have expanded copyright to include those words which war-
rant protection for the progress of copyright development.
Despite revision of the copyright law in 1831 and 1870, the copy-
right laws were criticized by President Roosevelt in his message to
Congress in December, 1905, for omitting provisions "for many arti-
cles which, under modern reproductive processes, are entitled to pro-
tection, . . ,,13 The Presidential message prompted, in 1906, the
initiation of congressional hearings 4 on a new copyright bill which
culminated in the passage of an act in March, 1909. The 1909 Copy-
(Continued from preceding page)
to strike a balance between two competing interests: the interest of authors in the fruits
of their labor on the one hand, and on the other, the interest of the public in ultimately
claiming free access to the materials essential to the development of society. M. NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT §5.4 (1973).
19 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 and n. 15 (1954).
70 The sessions of the Constitutional Convention were held in secret and therefor there is no
direct evidence concerning the intended scope of the word "writings." However, it appears
that that word was arrived at after some deliberation because four clauses other than the
one finally adopted were proposed to the Convention, none of which contained the word
"writings." COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 3, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 70
(1960).
71 Id. at 67. From the first Federal statute in 1790 to today, the copyright enactments have
gone beyond a narrow definition of writings. The 1790 act gave protection to books, maps,
and charts by authors who were citizens or residents of the United States. In 1884 the
Supreme Court, in Burrow-Oiles-Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884), held
that photographs were protected by the Act of 1802:
The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790 and the
act of 1802 by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many of
whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to
very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established
have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century it is almost
conclusive.
The Court in rejecting a literal interpretation of writings declared that they include "all
forms of writing . . . by which ideas are given visible expression." Id. at 58.
7Reiss v. National Quotation Bur., Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
7 H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 67, at 2.
74 The Librarian of Congress invited various interest groups to attend conferences in 1905-06
for the purpose of discussing a new copyright bill. As a result of these conferences the
Register of Copyrights drafted a bill and it was introduced on May 31, 1906 at H.R. 19853
and S. 6330 in the 59th Congress. Hearings were held before a joint committee of mem-
bers of the House and Senate Committees on Patents on June 6-9, and December 7, 8, 10
and 11, of 1906. A revised bill was introduced on January 29, 1907 as H.R. 25133 and
S. 8190. These bills were reported favorably by the committees on January 30, 1907 (H.
Rept. No. 7083, S. Rept. No. 6187, 59th Congress). No further action on the bills was
(Continued on next page)
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right Act despite its significant improvements over the years,75 in
attempting to adapt its terms to techniques of visual and aural record-
ing that have developed since 1909, has faced many of the same prob-
lems the earlier enactments encountered.
To qualify for protection under the federal copyright statute a
work must fit into one of thirteen specific categories of works. 76 Class
(c) "lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery)" is
limited to the unpublished scripts of nondramatic works. It includes
educational, news, or variety programs prepared for radio or tele-
(Continued from preceding page)
taken in the 59th Congress. In the 60th Congress, the bills favorably reported in the 59th
Congress were reintroduced in the House on December 2, 1907 (H.R. 243) and in the
Senate on December 16, 1907 (S. 2499). Hearings were held by the two committees
meeting jointly on March 26, 27 and 28 of 1908. On February 22, 1907 the House com-
mittee reported favorably (H.R. Rep. No. 2222) Representative Currier's bill H.R. 28192
and the same day Senator Smoot introduced a companion bill S. 9440 which the Senate
committee reported favorably on March 1, 1909 (No. 1108, 60th Congress). The Com-
mittee of the Whole House agreed to certain amendments of the Currier bill, H.R. 28192,
on March 2, 1909, and the bill as so amended was passed by the House on March 3 and
by the Senate on March 4, the last day of the 60th Congress. It was approved by the Presi-
dent on March 4, and became Public Law 349, the Copyright Act of 1909. By the act of
July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 652), the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, was codified and
enacted into positive law as title 17 of the U.S. Code. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY
No. 1, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1960).
7s Improvements achieved in 1909 include:
1) Making the subject matter of copyright include "all the writings of an
author."
2) Exempting books of foreign origin in foreign languages from the need
of being reprinted in the United States (this being the greatest advance from the
international standpoint).
3) In the case of published works, making copyright date from publication
with the notice, instead of from the date of filing the title, which often took
place long before the work was ready for publication.
4) Making statutory copyright available for unpublished works designed
for exhibition, performance or oral delivery.
5) Extending the renewal term of protection by 14 years, to bring possible
maximum term of protection up to 56 years.
6) Making the certificate of registration prima facie evidence of the facts
recorded in relation to any work.
H. HOWELL, supra note 68, at 8.
76 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1971). The application for registration shall specify to
which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
a) Books, including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetters, and other
compilations.
b) Periodicals, including newspapers.
c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery).
d) Dramatic or dramatico - musical compositions.
e) Musical compositions.
f) Maps.
g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art.
h) Reproductions of a work of art.
i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character.
j) Photographs.
k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of
merchandise.
(Continued on next page)
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
vision, but not formats, outlines or general descriptions of programs.7
Class (d) "Dramatic or dramatico musical compositions" includes
"the acting version of plays for the stage, motion pictures, radio,
television . . ."78 Class (1) "Motion pictures photoplays," and Class
(m) "Motion pictures other than photoplays" include dramatic and
nondramatic television films. These four classes include most of
the copyrighted material that cable television retransmits to its
subscribers.
The Act, however, does not protect the copyright holder against
all uses of his work, as exemplified in Fortnightly and Teleprompter
where cable television systems used copyrighted material without
infringement, but it does reserve exclusive rights79 to the copyright
holder in the categories of publishing, adaptation, performing and
recording.
The two theories under the 1909 Act by which cable television
can be said to be liable retransmitting copyrighted programming are
"copying," (which is included under the exclusive right of publishing)
and "performing." However, despite the broad scope of the term
"copying," 80 it is difficult to impute liability through infringement of
this concept in light of its prior judicial and statutory treatment. The
Supreme Court in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,81 by
holding that a player-piano roll did not "copy" the musical composi-
tion which it played, indicated that a "copy" must be a tangible repro-
(Continued from preceding page)
1) Motion picture photoplays.
m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
The enumeration . . . is primarily an administrfative provision to enable the
Copyright Office to perform its task in an orderly fashion, including the publica-
tion of a Catalog of Copyright Entries in conformity with the classes mentioned.
Hence this section very properly closes with a proviso that these specifications
shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright ....
H. HOWELL, supra note 68, at 22.
737 C.F.R. § 202.6 (1974).
78 37 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1974).
79 An 'exclusive right' in a copyrighted work is "the right to exploit the work in a particular
way and to prevent others from exploiting the work in that way without first obtaining
permission." B. RINGER & P. GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS 20 (Revised ed. 1965). Note, how-
ever, that a work independently created is not an infringing use because technically it is
not a use at all. Nonetheless, a resemblance may raise a presumption of copying and re-
sultant infringement, capable, of course, of rebuttal. Id. at 20-21.
In a broad sense substantially all of the enumerated rights under section one of
the Copyright Act are merely specific methods of copying, so that a copyright
law which proscribed only a copying would, if broadly construed, achieve the same
protection as is offered under the section one enumeration.... For instance, a
performance of a musical work is in a broad sense a copying of the work, and
might constitute an act of infringement under a copyright law which granted only
the exclusive right to copy.
5 0Nimmer, The Nature of the Rights Protected by Copyright, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 60, 62
(1962).
8 1209 U.S. 1 (1908).
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duction. The Court defined "copy" as used in the statute as "a written
or printed record of . . . intelligible notation. ' 82 "In order to have a
copy, one had to have something which could have served as one of
the copies required to be deposited with the Copyright Office."'83
The fact that White-Smith was decided at a time when means for
making nontangible images through television or motion pictures was
in an embryonic stage of development is persuasive that the tangibil-
ity requirement is outmoded, or at least that tangibility should include
the modern concept of evanescent copies. A TV image, although fleet-
ing and evanescent, is arguably tangible, just as "writing in the sand
is tangible in form even if the next wave will erase it forever. '84
However, not only may evanescence preclude the capability of copies
being deposited in the Copyright Office, but this theory of liability
also encounters the problem of subsequent statutory interpretation
which has retained the tangibility requirement. Rather than redefin-
ing "copy," the specific problem of mechanical reproduction of musical
works by piano rolls was dealt with by adding a new section, Section
1 (e) to the Act.85 The courts have continued until the present to util-
ize the tangibility requirement, 86 "so it seems unlikely that a court
would ignore this history by finding that a TV image is a copy.
8 7
The second theory of liability appears to be more usable and was
relied upon, albeit unsuccessfully, by the plaintiffs in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter - that cable television "performs" the copyrighted
material when it rebroadcasts the work to the home sets of its sub-
scribers. Thus, the section of the Act most relevant to cable television
grants copyright holders the exclusive right to "perform" the copy-
righted material. Section 1 (c) 88 grants the exclusive right to perform
nondramatic literary works, Section (d) 89 grants such right to dra-
matic works, and Section (e) 9 0 grants the same right with respect to
82/d.
8Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1514, 1515 (1967).
84 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 101.4 (1973). This is an expansion on the theory of Patterson
v. Century Productions, Inc. 93 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1937), where it was held that the act
of projecting motion picture film on a screen creates a copy and thereby infringes under
Sec. 1 (2) of the Act.
8580 HARV. L. REV., supra note 83, at 1516.
"See, e.g., Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Tiffany Productions Inc. v. Dewing, 50 F.2d 211 (D.C. Md. 1932).
8780 HARV. L. REV., supra note 83, at 1516.
"8 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1971):
c) To deliver, authorize the deliver of . . . the copyrighted work in public for
profit if it be a . . . nondramatic literary work . . . and to play or perform it
in public for profit . . . in any manner or by any method whatsoever.
9 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1971):
d) To perform . . . the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama . . . and
to exhibit, produce, perform, represent, or reproduce it in any manner or by
any method whatsoever. ...
'" Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1971):
e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical
composition.... 19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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musical compositions. Only "public" performances are included in
the performance rights provided by the copyright statute.9 1 The two
types of performing rights are: (1) Public performance, the right
to control any public performance is given only to the "dramas";
and (2) Public performance for profit. In the cases of "non-dramatic
literary works" and musical compositions, the copyright holder can
control only those public performances that are given "for profit."92
For purposes of the Act, it appears certain that cable television
is "public" even absent the fact that the audience need not be assem-
bled. Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Auto Accessories Co. 93
held that where the listeners are unable to communicate with each
other and receive the broadcast in the privacy of their homes, the
performance is nevertheless "public."
Cable television is also a "profit"-making venture for purposes
of the Act because cable operators charge subscribers a periodic fee
for service. All that is required is that the performance be given with
the expectation of direct or indirect pecuniary benefit; it is not neces-
sary that a direct payment be made.9 4
However, whether or not cable systems "perform" within the
meaning of the Act is not so clear. The linguistic, technological, and
economic factors involved in applying the 1909 Copyright Act to cable
television interact in such a way as to allow conflicting conclusions
regarding cable's liability for copyright infringement.
The linguistic realities of the situation are such that "in inter-
preting a statutory provision the court must attribute to the operative
word used that one of its meanings which accords most closely with
the intention of the enacting legislature and with the underlying pur-
pose which led the legislators to choose that particular word." 95 The
91 The author's public performing rights were first included in statutory copyrights re: dra-
matic works by the Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. In the act of January 6,
1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481, the public performing rights were extended to musical works.
The Act of March 4, 1909 ch. 320, § 5(b), 35 Stat. 1075, further extended the public
performing rights to works prepared for oral delivery. The Act also imposed the "for
profit" limitation on the performing rights in works prepared for oral delivery and musical
works but not on the performing rights in dramatic works. Id. § 1. By the Act of July 17,
1952, ch. 923, 66 Stat. 752, the author's public performing rights were extended to non-
dramatic literary works, subject to the "for profit" limitation. B. Varmer, Limitations on
Performing Rights, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1960),
in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 835 (A. Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
92 B. RINGER & P. GITLIN supra note 79, at 6.
935 F.2d 411, (6th Cir. 1925).
94 See, Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917), holding that music performed for cus-
tomers in a restaurant was for profit even though the customers were not charged addi-
tionally for the music.
95United Artists Telev'n, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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1909 Congress could not have had any specific intent to include cable
in the Copyright Act of the same year, for in 1909 radio was in its
very earliest stages of growth and television had not yet been in-
vented.9 6 The development of radio broadcasting presented the first
real challenge to the 1909 Act's ability to adapt to later technological
developments. The radio broadcast itself was held to constitute a
public performance within the meaning of the Copyright Act,9 but
this left unresolved the question of whether one who received the
radio broadcast and transmitted it to others was also "performing." 98
The legislative history of the 1909 Copyright Act reveals that
Sections 1 (c) and (d) of the Act were originally directed to the type
of situation in which the dialogue of a stage performance was tran-
scribed by a member of the audience who "would then turn the manu-
script over to some one who had hired him to do the work or sell to
outside parties. This manuscript would then be duplicated and sold
to persons, who, without any authority whatever from the author,
would give public performances of the work." The paradigm of
"performance" then was the classical conception of the performer
before an immediate audience,100 as differentiated from the modern
conception of performance, which includes an unassembled audience
"viewing" from the privacy of their own homes via radio or tele-
vision. The situation today with cable is thus one in which there is a
"... physical separation of the audience from the original or pri-
mary performance." 10 1 But the district court in Fortnightly treated
the modern situation as if it were a classical performance and at-
tached to it the same consequences that would result from an unau-
thorized primary performance in 1909. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Teleprompter, noted that the Supreme Court, in reaching
its decision in Fortnightly, had piled "analogy on analogy." 10 2 In other
words, the Court had analogized the concept of actor-theatre audience
to that of broadcaster-listener/viewer and had applied the same set
96The pioneer commercial radio broadcasting station was erected in 1920. The first com-
mercial television license was granted in 1941. 255 F. Supp. at 202 n. 12.
97M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923).
9See 47 U.S.C.A § 605 (1968), which specifies the prohibitions against unauthorized pub-
lication or use of communications.
99 H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 67, at 5.
100 The Fortnightly district court described the classic conception of the word performance as
"when Sir Laurence Olivier delivers Hamlet's soliloquy from the state of a theatre at
which there is an audience in attendance," and defined the classic elements of such per-
formance as "(1) an actor; (2) a work to be acted; and (3) an audience present to im-
mediately see and hear the actor." 255 F. Supp. 177, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The modern
elements of the performance described by that court were "(1) the rendition by the actor;
(2) the method of communicating the rendition to the audience; and (3) the method by
which the audience is enabled to perceive an audible and/or visible reproduction of the
original rendition." Id. at 203-04.
101 Id. at 204.
102 355 F. Supp. 618, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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of legal principles to each. The Court then proceeded to differentiate
a broadcaster from a cable system and accordingly conclude that
cable's function was more akin to that of the listener or viewer.
Case Law
The courts began to consider the listener-viewer problem in 1925
with the first of the "radio cases." Two types of cases developed:
cases dealing with broadcaster liability; and cases dealing with broad-
cast recipient liability. The first case to extend the classical concept of
performance to the modern context was Jerome H. Remick & Co. v.
American Auto Accessories Co.10 3 This case was the principal one in
the first category of cases dealing with liability of broadcasters and
is most significant for its broad interpretation of the 1909 Act. A
copyrighted song was played by a hotel orchestra and was subse-
quently broadcast, without authority of the copyright holder, over a
commercial radio station. The court held that the fact that radio
had not been developed before the 1909 Act did not preclude its being
fairly within the meaning of the statute. By the process of "semantic
extension"1 04 the court held that "the statute may be applied to new
situations not anticipated by Congress, if, fairly construed, such situ-
ations come within its intent and meaning."' 0 5 The court then analo-
gized the radio to the situation to the one where, in both the U.S.
and in England prior to the full development of photography, a photo-
graph was held to be an infringement of a copyrighted engraving
statute.
While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situa-
tions not fairly within their scope, they should not be so
narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because of
changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries.10 6
The first case to deal with "performance" as determining the
liability of broadcast recipients was Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty
Co.0 7 Jewell-LaSalle held that the copyright law prohibits a hotel
from using a master radio receiving set to transmit, without authority,
copyrighted works broadcast by a local station into the rooms of the
hotel's customers. The Court enunciated the doctrine of multiple
1035 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925).
104 Hunke, Community Antenna Television Operation as a "Performance": An Application
of the Principle of Semantic Extension to the Federal Copyright Act, 44 N.D. L. REV. 17
(1967). Justice Holmes' quote in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), is
appropriate:
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used.
10s5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
10 Id.
107283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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performance in which it recognized that there could be more than one
performance of the same work. Noting that although the legislative
intent may have been that once a broadcaster performs then one who
receives and distributes the transmitted selection cannot also be held
to have performed it, the court emphasized that the underlying pur-
pose - full protection to the composer's monopoly of public per-
formance - necessitated liability for infringement. Thus, the acts of
the hotel proprietor constituted a performance of the copyrighted
musical composition within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. Section 1 (e).
The Court rejected the hotel's argument that the process of receiving
a radio broadcast and translating it into audible sound was no differ-
ent from merely hearing the original music and upheld the allegation
of infringement, stating that the hotel was electronically reproducing
the original music and thereby "performing."
The next case in this second category of radio cases was So-
ciety of European State Authors and Composers, Inc. v. New York
Hotel Statler Co.,1"8 in which, unlike Jewell-LaSalle where the guests
had no control over the one-channel receiver, the radio system in
SESAC had two channels and the guests could not only choose
between two stations but also had the option of turning the sys-
tem off."0 9 The distinguishing feature of the two cases was the
quantum of the rebroadcasters' acts. In Jewell-LaSalle, performance
occurred when the master radio set received and audibly transmitted
the music; in SESAC, it was the guest, not the hotel, who performed
the last act necessary to audibly* reproduce the music by turning on
the speaker in his room.
Despite the distinction, however, Judge Woolsey rejected the
"last act necessary" principle and looked to the defendant hotel's
contribution to the total process.
[W] hen the owner of a hotel does as much as is done in the
Hotel Pennsylvania to promote the reproduction and trans-
mission within its walls of a broadcast program received
by it, it must be considered as giving a performance thereof
within the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the
LaSalle Hotel case.110
The multiple performance doctrine was obscured by the doctrine
of implied license which was first applied in Buck v. DeBaum'1 7 and
was given additional credence by Mr. Justice Brandeis' footnote in
108 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) [hereinafter referred to as SESAC.]
109 Id. at 4.
11Id. at 4-5.
11140 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929). The court held that a restaurant owner who provided
entertainment for his customers through a radio receiving set had an implied license to
"pick-up" out of the air the broadcast because the copyright holders license the broadcast-
ing station to disseminate the song. 23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1975
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Jewell-LaSalle. Brandeis suggested that had the original broadcaster
been licensed by the copyright holder, then the hotel would have had
an implied license to rebroadcast the radio signals. 112
In DeBaum, the District Court held there was no copyright in-
fringement when a cafe owner made available to his customers broad-
cast copyrighted works played on a regular radio receiving set. The
court noted that when the copyright holders "licensed the broadcast-
ing station to disseminate the... [copyrighted song], they impliedly
sanctioned and consented to any 'pick up' out of the air that was
possible in radio reception." 113
The subsequent case of SESAC brought into light a dichotomy
within the doctrine of implied license: license implied-in-law and
license implied-in-fact. The license implied-in-law as it existed in
Jewell-LaSalle comes not out of the express provisions of an agree-
ment between the copyright holder and the radio-station licensee, but
rather appears when the court feels that on the basis of public policy
there should be an implied license to receive and distribute the copy-
righted work. SESAC can be distinguished from Jewell-LaSalle and
DeBaum in that the licensing agreement in SESAC expressly pro-
hibited any sublicensing of the right to perform, and can be further
distinguished from Jewell-LaSalle by the fact that in SESAC, the
broadcasting station was licensed by the copyright proprietor to
perform the work. The express provision in SESAC to not sublicense,
of course, negated the court's finding of an implied license-in-fact, for
such a license only results when the contracting parties intend that
the licensing agreement will extend the right of performance to par-
ties outside the basic agreement. SESAC, however, still left open the
possibility that an implied-in-law license would be an appropriate
defense where public policy overrides the express intentions of the
parties.
Indeed, the question of implied license should not be dismissed
lightly; when a copyright holder licenses a broadcaster to perform
his work, this also licenses the public to receive the work"1 4 and, by
extension, may impliedly license cable television systems to aid the
public in its reception. The rationale is consistent with the purposes
of the Copyright Act - the primary purpose is achieved by encour-
aging the dissemination of original works to the public; and the secon-
dary policy of remuneration is satisfied by the license fee paid by the
broadcaster to the copyright holder." 5
112 83 U.S. at 199 n. 5.
11340 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929).
114 Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1522 (1967).
115Note, Copyright Law-Cable Television and Copyrightability, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
322, 328 n. 39 (1973).
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Nonetheless, the license implied-in-law theory was expressly re-
jected by the Second Circuit in United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp.116 ; and since on appeal the Supreme Court held
that there had been no performance it became unnecessary to decide
the issue of implied license.1 17
Fortnightly1 8 was the first case to expressly deal with the lia-
bility of cable television for copyright infringement as a "performer."
The Fortnightly cable system received and transmitted signals to
homes in Clarksburg and Fairmount, West Virginia that were broad-
cast by television stations in three cities ranging from 52 to 82 miles
away.11 9 The district court, in a detailed technical approach, held that
cable delivered a different image from that broadcast and thus in-
fringed by electronically reproducing telecast signals. The Second
Circuit, although affirming, used a quantitative approach akin to that
used in Jewell-LaSalle and SESAC: "how much did the defendant
do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work ?"120
The court held that the cable system, whose only business was to
bring about the viewing and hearing of broadcast television pro-
grams, did even more to infringe than did the hotel proprietors in
Jewell-LaSalle and SESAC whose "piping" in of radio programs
was only incidental to their hotel business. The Supreme Court re-
versed, rejecting both the district court's and circuit court's ap-
proach for a "functional" standard. The Court noted that were the
Second Circuit's quantitative test to be used to determine copyright
liability, the apartment house owner, shopkeeper and television set
manufacturer would then, by reductio ad absurdum, all be liable for
copyright infringement by at least indirectly bringing about the
"viewing and hearing of a copyrighted work. 12 1 In discarding the
earlier criteria of Jewell-LaSalle and the Second Circuit, the Court
held that the proper question to be asked was "[d] id CATV provide
the same kind of service, fill the same kind of role as broadcast-
116 377 F.2d 872, 880-84 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
117The Court was asked to consider the question of implied license in an amicus curiae brief
by the Solicitor General.
This "implied in law" license would not cover all CATV activity but only those
instances in which a CATV system operates within the 'Grade B Contour' of the
broadcasting station whose signal it carries. The Grade B contour is a theoretical
FCC concept defined as the outer line along which reception of acceptable qual-
ity can be expected at least 90% of the time at the best 50% of locations.
392 U.S. 390, 401 n. 32 (1968) (citation omitted).
118255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S.
390 (1968).
119 The television stations were in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Steubenville, Ohio and Wheeling,
West Virginia. Clarksburg is located about 82 miles from Pittsburgh; 57 miles from
Wheeling; and 74 miles from Steubenville. Fairmont is located about 67 miles from
Pittsburgh; 52 miles from Wheeling; 65 miles from Steubenville. 255 F. Supp. at 185.
120377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
121 392 U.S. 390, 397 (1968).
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ers ?"122 The underlying premise was that broadcasters perform, and
viewers do not.123 Noting that cable television was "active" only to
the extent that it improved reception like an ordinary antenna, the
Court held that in the final analysis cable functioned more like a
passive viewer than an "active" broadcaster. Holding that cable op-
erators do not "perform," the Court found a clear distinction between
broadcasting and cable:
Broadcasters select the programs to be used; CATV systems
simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they re-
ceive. Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them
to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have
been released to the public and carry them by private chan-
nels to additional viewers. 24
Justice Fortas, in his dissent, contended that the doctrine of
Jewell-LaSalle "stand[s] squarely in the path which the majority
today transverses." 125 Applying that holding to Fortnightly, Fortas
found that cable used mechanical equipment to amplify a copy-
righted performance to a wide population. Such a quantitative con-
tribution under the holding of Jewell-LaSalle constituted copyright
infringement.
Justice Fortas further found the functional test simplistic and
unsatisfactory. In refuting this new standard, Fortas issued to the
majority a caveat. Although analagous to a conventional rooftop
antenna in some instances, the functional test cannot apply to cable
stations that retransmit signals from appreciable distances beyond
the scope of conventional antennas. Such a situation would cause
cable to differ from the passive function of an antenna and accord-
ingly "perform" more like broadcasters. The subsequent case of Tele-
prompter was pursued as an effort to build upon the premise of the
Fortas dissent and thereby limit the Fortnightly holding.
Teleprompter Corporation v. Columbia Broadcasting System
Teleprompter was filed the same day as Fortnightly, but the
former was stayed pending the outcome of the latter. Plaintiff's
charges of damages in both suits were that they were deprived of
licensing fees for future rebroadcasts. Such a finding would have
enabled Columbia Broadcasting System to recover $250 to $5,000 in
'22Note, Cable Television and Copyright Royalties, 83 YALE L. J. 554, 561 (1974).
23Buck v. Debaum, 40 F.2d 734, 735 (S.D. Cal. 1929), held that viewers do not "perform"
copyrighted works:
One who manually or by human agency merely activates electronical instrumen-
talities, whereby inaudible elements that are omnipresent in the air are made
audible to persons who are within hearing, does not "perform" with the mean-
ing of the Copyright Law.
12United Artists Telev'n Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 390, 400-1 (1968).
12s Id. at 406-7.
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damages 126 as well as whatever net profit the CATV systems had
made on the showing of the copyrighted programs. 127 Further, Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System might have recovered attorney's fees
from the litigation. 128
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), had brought suit
against five community antenna television services located in repre-
sentative parts of the country. The systems, located in Elmira, New
York; Farmington, New Mexico; Rawlins, Wyoming; Great Falls,
Montana; and New York City, received the original broadcasts
through special antennae owned by Teleprompter, Inc., and subse-
quently transmitted the signals by means of cables and/or micro-
wave relay systems to the home of subscribers, where the subscrib-
ers' television sets converted the electronic signals into pictures and
sounds. Distances varied widely between the CATV stations and the
specific broadcasting sites. In some cases, the original broadcast was
close enough to the viewer that the viewer could have received the
signals with an ordinary rooftop antenna; in other cases, the ulti-
mate viewer was separated from the point of original broadcast by
more than 450 miles, a distance so great that, even without obstacles
such as mountains in between, the curvature of the earth would have
prevented any signal from reaching the viewer, no matter how
sophisticated his television reception apparatus. Between these ex-
tremes were individuals who could have received the original broad-
cast with conventional equipment, but only on certain occasions.
Plaintiffs, CBS, creators and producers of several television pro-
grams copyrighted under the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended,
sought to have defendant, Teleprompter Corporation, found in viola-
tion of the provisions of the Act. CBS contended that subsequent
developments since Fortnightly of community antenna television had
altered the similarity of CATV to a simple antenna device. CATV
systems, in 1974, not only relay programs already broadcast to their
subscribers, but also originate their own productions, actively sell
commercial time, and trade programs with other cable networks.
These developments, Columbia Broadcasting System contended, con-
verted CATV's function from that of a viewer to a performing broad-
caster, and thus made CATV liable for copyright infringement. Ad-
ditionally, CBS contended that the range, in many cases, of cable
12 Copyright Act § 2, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b) (1904).
12"//d"
2 Id. at § 116. Justice Fortas, in his dissent in Fortnightly, noted that Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle,
despite inadequacies in its reasoning, was nevertheless settled law and the Court's ma-
jority had abandoned precedent. Although Fortnightly's practical effect may have been to
overrule Jewell-LaSalle, the Court never expressly did so and thus presented a problem
in squaring Jewell-LaSalle with the decision in Fortnightly and the subsequent decision
of TelepromPter.
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television transmissions was beyond that of conventional television
antennae, thus differentiating the situation in Fortnightly where the
maximum range was about 82 miles.
The Court, had it found that CATV systems were infringing on
the copyrights of the plaintiffs, could have forced an entire re-
structuring of the current system of compensation for sales of tele-
vision broadcasting rights to copyrighted material, and, of course,
the FCC had acknowledged that it would have to revise its rules if
the copyright suits were decided adversely to CATV.129 There is even
the possibility that CATV would have been forced to revise its entire
financial structure,"' had the decision been contra.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority of the Court, first ex-
amined the contention that, regardless of the distance from the broad-
casting station, the reception and retransmission by the CATV sys-
tem was a "performance" of a copyrighted work. CBS also contended
that, despite the decision in Fortnightly, subsequent technological
developments must force the Court to re-examine its simple "func-
tion test" from Fortnightly that "broadcasters perform, viewers do
not perform"1 31 and its conclusion that the CATV function was pri-
marily a viewer's function. The basic argument was that the CATV
practice of producing and programming some of its own material
(undisputedly a "performance"), the sale of commercial air time,
and the trading of programs between CATV systems converted the
entire CATV system into a "broadcast function," and consequently
a "performance" under the Copyright Act. Justice Stewart rejected
this argument:
The copyright significance of each of these functions - pro-
gram origination, sale of commercials, and interconnection
-suffers from the same logical flaw; in none of these op-
erations is there any nexus with the defendants' reception
and rechanneling of the broadcasters' copyrighted materials.
As the Court of Appeals observed with respect to program
origination, "[e]ven though the origination service and the
reception service are sold as a package to the subscribers,
they remain separate and different operations, and we can-
not sensibly say that the system becomes a 'performer' of the
129 Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
130 Note, CATV and Copyright Liability: On a Clear Day You Can See Forever, 52 VA. L
REV. 1505, 1519 (1966).
131 United Artists Telev'n Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968).
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broadcast programming when it offers both origination and
reception services, but remains a non-performer when it
offers only the latter."132
At the appellate level, the court had borrowed a description
from United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. to distinguish between
signals from nearby stations and signals from distant stations, con-
cluding that where a CATV system supplemented "broadcasting by
facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas
in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; . . ." or
transmitted "to subscribers the signal of distant stations entirely
beyond the range of local antennae . . .,1133 the CATV system was
performing a broadcaster's function. The Supreme Court in Tele-
prompter rejected this argument, saying that the distance test was
not satisfactory because there was no change, for copyright pur-
poses, in the function CATV performed for its subscribers simply
because of a difference in distance. The television broadcaster, from
wherever he transmitted a program, made it public - available for
everyone who had the means to receive it. The Court then relied on
the basic "broadcaster-viewer" test set out in Fortnightly, saying
that
[t] he reception and rechanneling of these signals for simul-
taneous viewing is essentially a viewer function, irrespective
of the distance between the broadcasting station and the
ultimate viewer.13 4
The Supreme Court then rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the editing function, that is, the selection of programs to be shown,
of the CATV system placed it within a broadcasting framework. It
again relied on Fortnightly in concluding that CATV simply car-
ried, without editing, any programs that it chose; and that this was
not a creative function at all. 35
The final argument considered by the Court was the argument
of economic impact which the importation of distant signals could
have. Plaintiff contended that the importation of a copyrighted work
into a market which would not otherwise see the work would destroy
or at least greatly diminish the value of the work for "second runs",
or later showings within that market. This would mean that the
owner of the copyright would not get the full economic benefit of
32Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 405 (1974) (cita-
tion omitted).
33United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968), as cited in Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 1973).
14415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974).
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CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
the work in that he would be unable to sell later showings at as great
a price as he would have been able to had not CATV brought the
work in earlier.
The Court drew a distinction between who paid for the use of
the copyright in the case of television (advertisers) and who paid
for the use of the copyright in the case of books, plays, etc. (the
public). Justice Stewart then concluded that since there was no
direct economic relationship between the public and the owner of the
copyright, the owner of the copyright would simply have to negotiate
a different financial agreement with the broadcaster, taking into
consideration that the viewing market, due to CATV systems, may
be somewhat larger. He further stated that the shifts in current busi-
ness and economic relationships due to the CATV influence, while
they were important, were not something which could be controlled
by means of copyright legislation enacted before either broadcast
television or CATV were in existence. Consequently, he believed that
any further action in this vein should be left to Congress.
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, relied heavily on the distance
test set forth in the appellate court decision.136 He argued that the
natural barrier created by the curvature of the earth forms different
regulatory districts, and that any carrying of the signal outside of
those natural barriers constituted piracy of copyrighted programs.
Using the distance test he concluded that CATV systems, when they
operated outside of the narrow exceptions set forth in Fortnightly,
were broadcasting and thus in violation of the restrictions of the
Copyright Act which give the owner of the copyright an "exclusive
right" to present a creation "in public for profit" and to control how
the creation is "reproduced.' 37
Justice Blackmun filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part,
but agreeing with the Court of Appeals in distinguishing the Tele-
prompter case from Fortnightly on the basis of the distance test, con-
cluding that the CATV systems should be liable for copyright in-
fringement because they were performing a broadcaster's function
and not a viewer's function. 38
One of the major arguments which CBS advanced in Tele-
prompter was that distant transmissions through CATV would de-
stroy the secondary market for copyrighted material, and as a further
consequence, discourage creativity. The Court skirted this issue in
its decision. However, it did find a valid manner in which to dis-
tinguish the CATV situation from that of a book publisher or other
136 Id. at 417-18 (dissenting opinion).
137 Id. at 417-18 (dissenting opinion).
'3Id. at 415-16 (dissenting in part).
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areas: the public does not directly compensate the television media
for their broadcasting or transmissions as advertisers provide the
revenue; in other areas, the public directly provides the compensation.
While the appellate court said that
no evidence was presented to the court below to show that
regional or local advertisers would be willing to pay greater
fees because the sponsored program would be exhibited in
some distant market, or that additional advertisers would
pay more for a relatively minor increase in audience size
that CATV carriage would yield for a network program...139
no evidence apparently was presented to the contrary. In fact, the
argument can be made that a cable system expands the local audience,
making advertising time worth more, thus justifying a higher charge
for copyrighted materials. Further, the only reduction of copyright
royalties might occur where the products being advertised were
strictly local products. Since the majority of products advertised are
nationally used, the benefit should outweigh any negative effect. 40
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the instant decision will dis-
courage creativity and be contrary to public interest.
Analysis and Proposals
The holding in Teleprompter is a sound one, but the Court's
reasoning is unsatisfactory in its failure to rely upon or even con-
sider those approaches which take into account the underlying pur-
pose of both federal copyright law and considerations of public policy
essential to any question of copyright infringement. The Teleprompter
Court limited its holding to the question of "whether CATV trans-
mission of 'distant' signals constitutes a 'performance' under the
Copyright Act." 41 The better justification, however, for the Tele-
prompter decision lies not with the rejection of cable's rebroadcasts
as "performances" in the technical or linguistic sense but rather with
the underlying economic purpose of copyright. Copyright, in pro-
tecting the economic interests of the copyright holder against com-
petition, is guided by the economic philosophy of copyright law "that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare [emphasis added] through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'science and useful arts.' "142
139 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 476 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cit. 1973).
14052 VA. L. REv., supra note 130, at 1513-5.
141415 U.S. 394,413 n. 15 (1974).
1
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In light of the public interest potential inherent in the various
functions cable can perform, the decision in Teleprompter is con-
sistent with the basic mandate of the 1934 Communications Act, which
is the foundation for federal communications policy. The underly-
ing purpose of the Act is "to make available, so far as possible, to
all people of the United States, a rapid, efficient nationwide and
worldwide wire and radio communication service with adequate fa-
cilities at reasonable charges." 14 The increased channel capacity of
cable will offer broad public participation and such increased audience
access will not only result in a more informed public, but also will
increase opportunities for minorities and others previously excluded
to gain a foothold in programming.
Nonetheless, the public benefits that CATV can potentially create
are not without their limitations. Methods to allocate the most favor-
able program times need to be formulated. Also, the phrase "public
access" is rendered virtually meaningless in practice when the pur-
chase rates soar beyond the means of the local community. 1 "
There are three approaches that the Court might have taken
which would have been more consistent with the purpose of the law
of copyright. They are: (1) an "intermediary zone" theory; (2) the
fair use doctrine; and (3) the implied license theory which has al-
ready been discussed earlier in this Note.14 5
Intermediary Zone
The Court in Teleprompter recognized and analyzed two distinct
approaches to deal with the copyright-communications problem pre-
sented. They are the functional test and the quantitative test. Re-
gardless of the approach utilized, the end result sought was a deter-
mination of whether the cable system had acted as a performer and
thus broadcast the program or whether the system had merely been
a passive receiver, or viewer, of the program.
The difficulty with either approach is that each relies on the
assumption that there exists a clear, definable line separating broad-
casters and viewers. While such a line may have existed when the
Copyright Act of 1909 was enacted, as the stage was then often con-
sidered, today that demarcation line's existence is open to question:
technological advances of the past 65 years appear to have obliterated
it beyond recognition.
The reasons for the "performance" line's disintegration are
clearly demonstrated when CATV, a technological child of our day,
is analyzed in those terms. Without stretching the meaning of the
14347 U.S.C.A. 151 (1962).
I" THE SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 11, at 127.
145 See text at footnotes 111 through 117.
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words "broadcast," "perform" or "viewer" out of recognizable shape,
clearly a CATV system cannot be rightfully considered as engaging
in any of the three.
No contention is made that the terms of the Act should be re-
stricted to their literal meaning, for this would serve no beneficial
purpose. Nor is it sought to limit the application of legislation to
new situations not specifically envisioned. But that application has
limits and those limits have been demonstrated by the cable industry.
Instead of the "performance line" approach, what has emerged
today is a third, intermediary zone. On one side of this zone exists
a sector whose residents perform a viewer's function. To the other
side there exists the broadcasters or performers. Separating the sides
is the intermediary zone where cable television can be found. Since
from that perspective the elementary "broadcaster-liability; viewer-
no liability test" cannot be applied, the only reasonable alternative
is to rest a decision on more expansive considerations of public
policy and the economic foundations of the concept of copyright.
Essentially this approach would entail considering the economic
ramifications of the decision and the degree to which the public would
benefit. 14 Depending on the specific nature of the cable retransmis-
sion involved, the court could consider the economic realities of the
situation with respect to local broadcasters, the CATV systems, and
the copyright holders. Additionally, if the cable operator engaged in
distant signal importation the court could consider the extent to
which advertisers would be willing to pay additional amounts for the
extended broadcast market. Underlying these considerations would
be the court's desire to advance the public welfare by making the
benefits of the industry available to as many as economically per-
missible. Clearly such an approach by the court would involve a
more appropriate determination of liability than the simple per-
former-viewer test.
Fair Use
If the function test is retained, despite its simplicity, the fair
use doctrine 147 may come into play. The doctrine arises where the
Court has deemed that cable has "performed" the copyrighted work.
146 See generally, Note, Cable Television and Copyright Royalties, 83YALE L. J. 554 (1974).
4 7 
"Fair use" has been defined by BALL, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
260 (1944) as
a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright, to use the copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without his consent; notwithstanding the monop-
oly granted to the owner by the copyright.
Fair use may be considered either as a de minimum infringement which is excused, or it
may be a use beyond that accorded copyright protection and therefore no infringement at
all. PFORZHEIMER, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT LAW AND FAIR USE 269
(1964). See generally, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, No. 73-68 (Ct. Cl.,
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When a cable system operates as a mere antenna on a hill, as in Fort-
nightly, there is little doubt that it is likened to a viewer's function
and is not "performing." In that situation the fair use doctrine would
have no relevant application. When a cable system transmits signals
beyond the reach of a conventional antenna, on the other hand, the
question is not as easily resolved and is shaky ground upon which
to determine copyright liability. Given this weak foundation, Justice
Douglas' dissent, which maintains that the importation of distant
signals is, indeed, a broadcast function, is not difficult to comprehend.
The fair use doctrine would apply where cable is held to perform as
a broadcaster and operates by relieving cable of any liability for in-
fringement despite the performance.
The judicial doctrine of fair use is a privilege which arises when
the copyright holder's limited monopoly conflicts with public policy.
In such a case the copyright holder's claim to share in all the profit
derived from use of his work must yield to a "reasonable" use of the
copyrighted work without infringement. Two of the major factors
considered by the courts in applying the doctrine to a particular situ-
ation are: (1) the extent to which the use is in competition with
the copyright owner and affects his market; and (2) the user's
reasons for appropriating the work."4
In considering the first factor it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween local and distant signal importation. By receiving signals at
antenna sites adjacent to the viewing communities the cable, rather
than being in competition with local broadcasters, actually increases
their viewing audience within the local community and thus aids the
copyright owner's market. As noted earlier, when distant signals
are imported, the extent to which distant signal importation dilutes
and adversely affects the copyright owner's market is open to ques-
tion, and is more properly adjudged in each particular fact situation.
The other factor is the user's reason for appropriating the work.
"There seems to be a tendency in the courts to give the doctrine of
fair use a broader scope in fields of learning and a narrower scope
where commercial gain is the primary purpose." 149 It is not disputed
that cable systems profit by charging periodic subscriber fees, but
the technological and social uses of cable are characterized by a
potential to give the individual the key to the world's store-
house of knowledge. It can provide a complete telecommuni-
cations system linking the person in the home with space
14 B. RINGER & P. GITLIN, supra note 79, at 30-31 (Revised ed. 1965).
149 PFORZHEIMER, supra note 147.
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satellites, radios, television sets, facsimile receivers, tele-
phones, teletypes, computers, data storage and retrieval
mechanisms, and other communications technology. 150
As the Sloan Commission and the Cable Report to the President have
indicated, the growth of cable is clearly in the public interest, and
as such its broadcast dissemination of copyrighted work can be said
to be consistent with the primary purpose of copyright - to advance
the public welfare.
Whatever approach is taken, the Court would have done bet-
ter to look not at "what rights copyright protects in the light of
history, but what rights it should protect in view of its purpose and
function."' 51
Legislation
Copyright revision legislation, which will hopefully unravel the
copyright communications knot, has long been a subject of Congres-
sional inquiry. In 1955, under Congressional authorization, a copy-
right revision project was launched with a program of studies in-
spired by the late Arthur Fisher, then Register of Copyrights.152 The
years from 1955 to 1961 were consumed with thoughtful study and
research on the problem of copyright revision. Released at the end
of that period was a series of 34 monographs prepared by the staff
of the Copyright office and experts outside the staff. 53 The reports
focused on the historical aspects of the present law, the issues in-
volved, and the various proposals. Shortly afterwards, in 1961, the
Register issued the results of the research committee's work detail-
ing recommendations for an omnibus statute and synthesizing the
various viewpoints of the committee's members into a tentative con-
clusion on each issue. Afterwards followed three years of drafting,
debate, and discussion leading to the introduction, in 1964, of a Copy-
right Revision Bill at the request of the Register of Copyrights.'5
Again at the request of the Register, a second bill containing further
changes was introduced into the 89th Congress. 55 Following hear-
ings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee
this bill was favorably reported 5 6 but not enacted. In the Ninetieth
150 Barrow, OTP and FCC: Role of the Presidency and the Independent Agency in Communi-
cations, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 291, 298 (1974).
11 L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 219 (1968).
"S*Goldman, The Copyright Law: Nearly Sixty Years Later, 28 OHIO ST. L. J. 261, 273
(1967).
153 Kastenmeier, Revision Revisited, 16 BULL. CR. SoC. 269, 270 (1969).
1
-SH.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
" H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., lst Sess. (1965).
'S H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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Congress, revision bills were again introduced in the House 57 and the
Senate. 58 The House bill, which included a section covering cable TV
operations, was favorably reported to the House.159 That section, how-
ever, was struck from the bill on the floor of the House prior to
enactment in order to refer the matter to the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee which has jurisdiction over communications.
Recognizing the overlapping nature of legislation which revised
copyright laws in light of CATV functions, and the need for such
proposals to be jointly considered by the other concerned committees,
Congressman Moore, at the time of deletion, remarked:
[W]hat we seek to do in this legislation is control CATV
by copyright. I say that is wrong. I feel if there is to be
supervision of this fast-growing area of news media, it
should legitimately come to this body from the legislative
committee that has direct jurisdiction over the same. "* * *
This bill and the devices used to effect communications policy
are not the proper functions of copyright * * * -16o
The following year the same bill was reintroduced into the Senate
as S. 543 but no significant action was taken.
In March of 1973, S. 1361161 was introduced into the Senate.
Intended as a major overhaul of copyright laws in light of the
changed technology since the 1909 Copyright Act, the bill contains a
section proposing to solve the cable system issue,1 62 similar in numer-
ous respects to the Consensus Agreement endorsed by the FCC in the
Spring of 1972. Provisions are set forth limiting the number of
distant channels that, depending on the size of the television market,
may be imported. 63 In this way it is hoped that the market receiv-
ing the outside signals will not be excessively fractionalized, thus
threatening the viability of local stations.
In addition to limiting outside signals, Section 111 also requires
that, once again depending on the size of the market, one or more
local signals be transmitted on the cable system. The consent to
transmit local and distant signals would be granted the cable oper-
ators through a system of compulsory licensing.1 ". Essentially this
means that stations are to be granted a full blanket license to re-
S7 H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
s1 S. 597, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
15 9H.R. REP. No. 83, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
160 113 Cong. Rec. 8599. See generally, id. at 8598-8601, 8611-8613, 8618-8622, 8990-8992.
161 S. 1361, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
162 Id. at § 111.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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transmit programs to the extent permitted by FCC carriage regu-
lations, in effect, freeing the cable operators from the insurmount-
able task of attempting to negotiate with broadcast stations for each
individual program sought to be retransmitted.
The stumbling block preventing the parties from reaching an
agreement, and the subject which consumed a major portion of the
subcommittee's hearings, 165 has been the topic of copyright fee pay-
ments. When all parties agreed to and signed the Consensus Agree-
ment the conditions agreed upon were that, should the parties fail to
adopt a fee schedule which would be fair and reasonable to all
parties concerned, the issue would be decided by arbitration. As
previously noted nearly 60 hours of negotiations produced no fee
agreement, the amounts demanded and being offered remaining widely
separated. Subsequently, CATV interests refused to enter into the
arbitration hearings and instead backed the fee schedules tenta-
tively contained in S. 1361.
At the legislative hearings some aspects of the refusal to
arbitrate were illuminated. Broadcasters and copyright holders con-
sistently maintained that cable television had received all the benefits
of the Consensus Agreement - through the lifting of the distant
signal importation restrictions which had frozen CATV developments
- but now refused to pay the price of these benefits by arbitrating
the amounts due for retransmission of broadcasts.1 66 Just as con-
sistently, the cable operators contended that they had negotiated faith-
fully in order to reach a compromise but that they would not permit
copyright fee policy to be fixed by arbitration which they maintained
could succumb to the more powerful interests i.e., broadcasters and
copyright holders.1 67 Furthermore, the hearings brought out the fact
that cable operators had been presented with much of the Consensus
Agreement on a take it or leave it basis. To leave it would mean con-
tinuation of the distant signal importation restrictions and the un-
profitable investment climate those restrictions created. "Take it"
then seemed the only viable alternative.
When the subcommittee convened hearings on the proposed legis-
lation in the summer of 1973 these conflicting accounts of the cable
agreement negotiations surfaced in the testimony of and papers
submitted by the respective parties. In the environment thus created,
broadcasters went on to request that the arbitration initially agreed
to be implemented. Specifically sought was a commission that would
determine, through independent research, investigation and analysis,
where the proper fee rate should be set, with the results binding on
16 Hearings, sapra note 53.
166 Id. at 278, statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.
167 Id. at 397, statement of David Foster, President, National Cable Television Association.
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all parties. 168 Stressing the fact that the tentative fee schedule 169
contained in S. 1361 was written in 1969 and, at the time, was not
based on an empirical study, broadcasters urged the subcommittee
not to approve the haphazard provision and instead commence a
study on the matter.
Opposing this view, cable operators noted that further study
on the matter, in light of the previous extended negotiations, would
bear no fruit. Describing the probable results of such a study, David
Foster, President of the National Cable Association, remarked:
If that tribunal were to be convened today, it would have
the same difficulties that the parties had during the past 2
years trying to conduct negotiations- they would simply
be speculating as to the future of this industry, but they
wouldn't be dealing with anything except one economist
theorizing from one direction and another economist theoriz-
ing from the opposite direction. What would come up would
be certainly no more valid, and I suspect a lot less valid, than
the wisdom of the Senate.
And, therefore, we are supporting the concept of S.
1361 that the fee schedule to be [sic] imposed at this time
with arbitration or a statutory tribunal, whichever you want
to call it, coming into play at a time when we have evidence
to deal with.17 0
When the conclusion of various economic studies on proposed
fee schedules are examined, Foster's statement appears all the more
accurate. A study undertaken by Bridger M. Mitchell reached the
conclusion that
. . . [t]he proposed statutory fee schedule . . . would gen-
erally lower rates of return on total capital a full percentage
point for systems in the profitable range, and in an im-
portant proportion of the cases its leveraged effect on equity
investors would be sufficient to create unprofitable systems.
17 1
'"See note 168 supra.
169S. 1361 § 111(d) (2) (B), where relevant, provides as follows:
A total royalty fee for the period covered by the statement, computed on the
basis of specified percentages of the gross receipts from subscribers to the cable
service during said period . . . as follows:
(i) 1 percent of any gross receipts up to $40,000;
(ii) 2 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $40,000 but not more
than $80,000;
(iii) 3 percent of gross receipts totalling more than $80,000, but not more than
$120,000;
(iv) 4 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $120,000, but not more
than $160,000; and
(v) 5 percent of any gross receipts totalling more than $160,000.
170 See note 167 supra.
171 Mitchell, Cable Television Under the 1972 FCC Rules and the Impact of Alternative Copy-
right Fee Proposals-An Economic Analysis (1972), in Hearings supra note 162, at
426, 466.
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A second study, backed by broadcasting and copyright interests, and
conducted by Robert W. Crandall and Lionel L. Fray, conflictingly
concluded that
[t]he resulting estimates of cable profitability find medium
to large size systems earning in excess of 20 percent on
capital in nearly every situation in the absence of copyright
payments. These returns are above those deemed necessary
to attract investment capital to the industry. Thus, we con-
clude that substantial copyright fees could be paid without
inhibiting the growth of typical cable systems in the country's
major markets as they are presently conceived. 172
The subcommittee appeared anxious to complete the task at
hand by setting rate schedules themselves rather than delegating the
task, and thus effectively delaying a final result, to an independent
committee. Considering this mood it is perhaps not surprising that
early in June 1974, the Judiciary Committee, meeting as a whole,
voted to halve the royalty rates contained in Section 111. As a result
of that action fees now levied on revenues will range from 1/2 per cent
for systems grossing less than $40,000 per year to 21/2 per cent for
those grossing more than $160,000.11 Complementary action was taken
on the bill's provision which called for a copyright tribunal to convene,
and readjust rates if necessary, three years after enactment. As re-
vised, the tribunal is to meet six months after enactment and at five-
year intervals thereafter.
These actions signify a clear victory for CATV. Yet this victory
remains unique since there exists no genuine loser. Cable industries
will benefit from the lower royalty rates imposed by the impending
legislation; broadcasters will gain as a result of the carriage restric-
tions placed on CATV systems; and finally copyright holders will
reap the royalty payments which the Copyright Act of 1909, as inter-
preted in Teleprompter, does not permit. But these gains aside, the
true victory for all involved clearly depends on the ultimate passage
of S. 1361. The stability that it is expected to produce in the fields
of copyright and communications can only benefit all concerned. And
only in this climate can the interests of the public be given the care
and attention they rightfully deserve.
Lee Fisher
Sam Salah
172 Crandall and Fray, The Profitability of Cable Television Systems and Effects of Copyright
Fee Payments (1973), in Hearings supra note 162, at 317, 376.
173 86 BROADCASTING, June 17, 1974 at 17.
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